On the fourfold root of the principle of sufficient reason, and On the will in nature; two essays


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He simply thinks that he can provide a clear answer to the latter question as well: God or the being which is the ground of its own existence. For as I find it in a certain Jew, called Rab Chasdai, it runs as follows: if there is an infinite regress of causes , then all things that are will also have been caused; but it does not pertain to anything which has been caused, to exist necessarily by the force of its own nature; therefore, there is nothing in Nature to whose essence it pertains to exist necessarily; but the latter is absurd; therefore, the former is also.

Hence the force of this argument does not lie in the impossibility of there being an actual infinite or an infinite regress of causes, but only in the supposition that things which do not exist necessarily by their own nature are not determined to exist by a thing which does necessarily exist by its own nature. In this passage, Spinoza follows the late medieval Jewish philosopher Hasdai Crescas in rejecting the Aristotelian ban on actual infinity see Melamed For Spinoza and Crescas the existence of an infinite regress of causes is perfectly legitimate.

Yet, if all the items in this infinite chain are contingent beings i. The ultimate reason for the instantiation of such an infinite chain of contingent beings must, claims Spinoza, be a being whose existence is not contingent for otherwise, the chain will remain merely contingent and its instantiation in reality would not be sufficiently explained. Thus, Spinoza allows for an infinite regress of causes or explanations as long as the entire infinite chain is grounded in a being which exists by virtue of its mere essence.

He was the first to call it by name and, arguably, the first to formulate it with full generality. His treatment of the PSR is also noteworthy for its systematicity and the centrality that he accords it. For example, in the Monadology he writes:. Our reasonings are based on two great principles, that of contradiction, in virtue of which we judge that which involves a contradiction to be false, and that which is opposed or contradictory to the false to be true.

And that of sufficient reason, by virtue of which we consider that we can find no true or existent fact, no true assertion, without there being a sufficient reason why it is thus and not otherwise, although most of the time these reasons cannot be known to us. These principles are characterized in what appears to be epistemic terms. And yet it is clear that Leibniz intends them to have metaphysical as well as epistemic import. In the case of the PSR, this will become more evident when we discuss how Leibniz understands the notion of a sufficient reason but it is already indicated in the passage quoted above by the fact that Leibniz explicitly states that there are sufficient reasons for every truth or fact even if such reasons are unknowable by us.

The scope of the PSR, as stated above, includes facts and truths. Leibniz sometimes, however, characterizes the scope of the principle in different terms. For example, he writes:. This suggests a version of the PSR that applies not to truths or facts but rather events: Every event has a sufficient reason. Rather they are usually understood as indicating that Leibniz views the scope of the PSR to be very wide, perhaps even absolutely general, but at least wide enough to encompass facts, truths, and events see Rodriguez-Pererya forthcoming.

Leibniz associates the Principle of Contradiction and the PSR with a variety of domains where each is especially important.

Schopenhauer Four Fold Roots of the Principle of Sufficient Reason

For example, there are domains where the truths of the domain depend on one of the two principles. There are also domains that are characterized in terms of subject matter or areas of inquiry. It is far from obvious that these two ways of assigning domains to the Principles are equivalent. For example, it would be natural to assume that metaphysics and natural theology would include necessary propositions and thus the PSR would encroach upon the territory assigned to the Principle of Contradiction according to the modal characterization.

We must therefore distinguish distinct ways of associating the principles with various domains. The first way is to specify the domain to which each principle applies. Leibniz appears to believe that, according to this approach, there is a single universal domain and it is associated equally with each principle. There are no contradictory contingent facts or truths and so the Principle of Noncontradiction applies to all contingent truths as well as all necessary truths. Likewise, it is usually assumed that, for Leibniz, every necessary truth has a sufficient reason see Broad 12 and 34 and Rodriguez-Pererya forthcoming.

For example, mathematical truths, might have sufficient reasons in the form of proofs that rest on statements of identity. Thus the PSR applies to all necessary truths as well as all contingent truths. The second way of associating the principles with specific domains is to specify the domain of truths that is grounded on or depends on each principle. According to Leibniz, only contingent truths depend on and are grounded by the PSR.

Likewise, Leibniz believes that only necessary truths depend on and are grounded by the Principle of Contradiction. What does it mean for some truths to depend on a principle? Leibniz is not explicit on this point but we will get a better idea in the next section when we consider the question of what counts as a sufficient reason. The third way is to specify a domain of truths that can be investigated on the basis of each principle.

For Leibniz, we can know mathematical truths only on the basis of the Principle of Contradiction and only metaphysical, theological, and physical truths require the PSR in order to be known. We will see in more detail in what way the PSR allows us to investigate these domains the section on applications. An a priori proof is a proof that reflects the causal order. Thus a sufficient reason would be a proof that is both a demonstration and an explanation see Adams Let us begin with truth. To keep things simple, we will focus only on categorical propositions of subject-predicate form. A proposition is true, according to Leibniz, just in case the concept of the predicate is contained in the concept of the subject.

Uncontroversially, the concept of the predicate is unmarried is contained in the concept bachelor and it is this conceptual containment which explains the truth of the statement bachelors are unmarried. But Leibniz makes the further highly controversial claim that all true statements are true for this reason, even statements like Caesar crossed the Rubicon. That is, this statement is true because the concept crossed the Rubicon is contained in the concept of Caesar.

This theory of truth is sometimes called the conceptual containment theory of truth. It has as a consequence that all truths are analytic. After all, how could an analytic truth be contingent? In response to this worry, Leibniz develops an account of contingency in terms of infinite analysis. A demonstration results when an identity is obtained through the process of analysis in a finite number of steps. Leibniz claims that all and only necessary truths have a finite demonstration by analysis and all and only contingent truths do not have a demonstration by analysis in a finite number of steps.

In this way, he preserves the distinction between necessary and contingent truths while also maintaining that all truths are analytic, that is, true in virtue of the meaning of the concepts involved. This has led some commenters to think that Leibniz gave up the account of sufficient reason as an a priori proof. If there were a proof or demonstration, it would reveal that the concept of the predicate was contained in the concept of the subject in a finite number of steps and hence every proposition would be necessary. Leibniz is not a necessitarian in his mature philosophy and thus he could not have accepted this consequence.

Instead, he must have shifted from the conception of a sufficient reason as an a priori proof to that of an a priori proof sequence, where the latter notion is understood as an analysis that converges on an identity without reaching it in a finite number of steps see Sleigh What it means for an analysis to converge on an identity is, unfortunately, obscure.

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Nevertheless, there is some clear sense in which every contingent truth has a sufficient reason on this understanding. The sufficient reason why it is true that Caesar crossed the Rubicon, for example, is that the concept crossing the Rubicon is contained in the concept Caesar. The truth of the proposition obtains in virtue of the concepts of the subject and the predicate. Of course, this reason is undiscoverable by any finite human mind because it is buried too deeply in the concept of Caesar. Only God, in his omniscience sees the conceptual connection between them.

It is enough for there to be such a connection for there be a sufficient reason. Such a conception of the nature of a sufficient reason have lead some commentators to think that for Leibniz the PSR is a logical notion or that it is a metaphysical notion that is ultimately reducible to logic Couturat ff and Russell v.

But the notion of a sufficient reason as a non-terminating proof sequence is not the only conception of a sufficient reason to be found in Leibniz. And other conceptions have a decidedly less logical and more metaphysical flavor. This force is the nature or essence of the substance. Now according to Leibniz, substances do not causally interact with one another see the entry Leibniz on causation.

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The changes that they undergo derive solely from their own natures or primitive active force, which consequently determines the whole of its history. In many ways primitive active force plays the role of the concept of the subject in the logical version of the PSR. Just as on the logical version the PSR that a is F is explained by the fact that the concept of F -ness is in the concept of a , so too on the metaphysical version of the PSR fact that a is F is explained by the primitive active force of a that determines it to be F.

Whereas commentators such as Couturat and Russell emphasize the logical notion of a sufficient reason to the detriment of the metaphysical notion, other commentators see the logical and the metaphysical as two equally fundamental presentations of the same datum see Frankel Another metaphysical characterization of a sufficient reason connects with the Principle of the Best, which says that for any proposition p , p is true just in case p holds in the best possible world G VI.

It is, in fact, a consequence of the PSR in conjunction with three additional assumptions: 1 the sufficient reason for every choice is that the chooser perceives it to the best; 2 God chooses the actual world; 3 God perceives something to be what is best just in case it is the best. In some texts, Leibniz suggests that the sufficient reason for contingent truths cannot be found in the concepts or natures of things. We must instead look to the Principle of the Best Mon. Those reasons are to be found internal to the concept of the subject or the nature of the substance.

Reasons that advert to the Principle of the Best look outside the concept of the subject or the nature of the substance and make comparisons between worlds in terms of their relative perfections. It is possible that Leibniz thought that these different conceptions of sufficient reasons were equivalent but that they are so is far from obvious.

The concept of a requisite is that of a necessary condition. In this context, Leibniz defines a sufficient reason as a sufficient condition. If something exists, then all of its requisites have been posited. Leibniz then asserts that if all of a things requisites have been posited, then it exists. The question-begging assumption is that all the necessary conditions for something to exist are jointly sufficient for it to exist. Anybody who denies the PSR will not agree with this assumption and it is clearly not encoded in the definitions of requisite and sufficient reason provided by Leibniz.

Every truth is such that the concept of the predicate is contained the concept of the subject. This conceptual connection is the sufficient reason for the truth. Thus every truth has a sufficient reason. This observation has led some scholars to conclude that rather than deriving the PSR from the conceptual containment theory of truth, Leibniz was in fact led to the conceptual containment theory from his antecedent commitment to the PSR.

The conceptual containment theory explains how there could be a sufficient reason for every truth by guaranteeing that there will be an explanation in terms of conceptual relations see Adams He says that there are many cases where a fact has a sufficient reason and no cases where fact is known not to have a sufficient reason. He then says that it is reasonable to assume that the PSR holds in all cases where we do not know that sufficient reason. Leibniz says that PSR is needed if we are to go beyond mathematics to metaphysics and natural science.

How does the PSR help in those domains of inquiry?

On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and on the Will in Nature; Two Essays

There is a general pattern of argument that Leibniz uses to establish conclusions using the PSR. First he assumes the falsity of what he wants to prove. Call the proposition to be proved p. Then he tries to show that if p were false, there would be some fact or truth for which there was no sufficient reason. But by the PSR, there is no fact or truth. Therefore, p is true. Leibniz uses this template to argue for a number of claims, including the identity of indiscernibles, relationalism with respect to space and time, and the existence of God.

Let us briefly look at how Leibniz uses the PSR to argue for each of these theses. Suppose that God does not exist. If God does not exist, then the only things that exist are contingent beings. Would the entire series of contingent things have an explanation? The explanation of the entire series cannot be a member of the series since then it would explain itself and no contingent thing is self-explanatory. But the explanation cannot be outside of the series because we have assumed that there is no non-contingent being, i.

Thus if God did not exist, there would be something unexplained: the series of contingent beings. Everything has an explanation. Therefore God exists. If there were two such things, God would have treated them differently insofar as he has related them differently to the rest of the world. Leibniz claims that since they are indiscernible from each other, there could be no reason for God to treat them differently.

Thus if there were two indiscernible individuals, then God would have acted for no reason.

But there is a reason for everything. So, there are no indiscernible yet numerically distinct things. Auguste Comte And Positivism. John-Stuart Mill. The Essential Peirce, Volume 2. Peirce Edition Project. Dennis Sweet. On the Origin of Language. Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Marie-Louise von Franz.

The Ethics of Psychoanalysis Jacques Lacan. The Use of Bodies. Giorgio Agamben. Works of Henri Bergson. The Philosophy of the Enlightenment. John Hibben. The Metaphysics of Evolution. Chad Ripperger. Thomas Whittaker. My View of the World. Kant's Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics. Vladimir Solovyov. The Great Philosophers: Descartes. John Cottingham. Patrick Frierson. Nils F.


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Richard Tarnas. Otto Weininger. The Prince. Niccolo Machiavelli. The Creative Mind. Steven Nadler.

From Plato to Wittgenstein. The World as Will and Representation, Vol. Peirce on Signs. James Hoopes. Discourse on Method and Related Writings. Desmond Clarke. Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra. Jacob Klein. Paradigms for a Metaphorology. Hans Blumenberg. Divine Machines. Justin E. Classics of Spiritual Philosophy and the Present. Conversely, all causality, hence all matter, and consequently the whole of reality, is only for the understanding, through the understanding, in the understanding. The first, simplest, ever-present manifestation of understanding is perception of the actual world.

This is in every way knowledge of the cause from the effect, and therefore all perception is intellectual. Thus, our understanding does not exist independent of our ability to perceive and determine relationships anchored in experience itself. Not only what we think in the abstract, but also our very perceptions are completely intellectual and subjectively determined via extraction, new formation, and modified formulation.

One may also translate "Vorstellung" as the English word "idea" — indeed, Schopenhauer himself provides this translation from Kant's similar use of "Vorstellungen. It amounts to what Schopenhauer has done, in his view, to extend and complete what Kant began in his Critique of Pure Reason.

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On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason and On the Will in Nature: Two Essays

Hence, four classes of objects occur always and already only in relation to a known subject, according to a correlative capacity within the subject. These classes are summarized as follows:. Why does a subject act the way he does? When the actual moment comes to act, we do so within the constituents of the rhetorical situation the various representations presented within subjective experiences and may be often surprised by what we actually say and do. The human sciences find their ground in this aspect of the principle. The principle, in another point of view, provides the general form of any given perspective, presupposing both subject and object.

The thing in itself, consequently, remains forever unknowable from any standpoint, for any qualities attributed to it are merely perceived, i. Kant termed this critical or transcendental idealism. This intuition of the a priori understanding is a modern elucidation of the postmodern expression "always already": [8] time and space always and already determine the possibilities of experience.

Additionally, Schopenhauer distinguishes from this something he calls a "spurious a priori": cultural perspectives ideologies one is born into that determine one's relationship to experience, in addition to the forms of space and time. Payne concisely summarized the Fourfold Root. Our knowing consciousness

On the fourfold root of the principle of sufficient reason, and On the will in nature; two essays On the fourfold root of the principle of sufficient reason, and On the will in nature; two essays
On the fourfold root of the principle of sufficient reason, and On the will in nature; two essays On the fourfold root of the principle of sufficient reason, and On the will in nature; two essays
On the fourfold root of the principle of sufficient reason, and On the will in nature; two essays On the fourfold root of the principle of sufficient reason, and On the will in nature; two essays
On the fourfold root of the principle of sufficient reason, and On the will in nature; two essays On the fourfold root of the principle of sufficient reason, and On the will in nature; two essays
On the fourfold root of the principle of sufficient reason, and On the will in nature; two essays On the fourfold root of the principle of sufficient reason, and On the will in nature; two essays

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